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Intuitions, Externalism, and Conceptual
Analysis
Jussi Haukioja
Department of Philosophy, University of Turku
Semantic externalism about a class of expressions is oen thought to make con-
ceptual analysis about members of that class impossible. In particular, since exter-
nalism about natural kind terms makes the essences of natural kinds empirically
discoverable, it seems that mere reection on one’s natural kind concept will not
be able to tell one anything substantial about what it is for something to fall un-
der one’s natural kind concepts. Many hold the further view that one cannot even
know anything substantial about the reference-xers of one’s natural kind concepts
by armchair reection. In this paper I want to question this latter view and claim
that, because of theway our standardmethodology of doing theories of reference re-
lies on semantic intuitions, typical externalists in fact presuppose that one can know
the reference-xers of one’s natural kind concepts by mere armchair reection.e
more interesting question is how substantial such knowledge can be. I also take
some steps toward answering this question.
Keywords: intuition, semantic externalism, conceptual analysis
1. Introduction
It is oen assumed that an externalist view of meaning or content (for a class
of concepts or expressions) precludes the possibility of conceptual analysis
about members of the class. Externalism about a given concept Cmakes the
semantic content of C depend on the nature of the external world, and it is
generally thought to follow that mere possession of C cannot then put one
in a position to know anything substantial about what it is for something to
fall under C. In this paper I want to question this common line of thought.
Whether a certain concept is to be given an externalist semantics depends
on our semantic intuitions about the correct applicability of that concept,
and hence mere possession of a concept does put one in a position to know
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something about its content. How substantive that something turns out to be
is unclear, as is the question of whether the armchair activity I’m defending
deserves to be called conceptual analysis. My aimhere is to take at least some
steps towards answering these questions.
Most philosophers of language today (though not all) think that the ar-
guments given by Kripke and Putnam in the 1970’s (Kripke 1980, Putnam
1975) establish that one cannot know the essences of individuals and natural
kinds merely on the basis of being a competent user of a proper name, or of
possessing a natural kind concept. Perhaps most famously, Putnam’s Twin
Earth example has convinced most philosophers that the essence of water
is having the molecular composition H2O (assuming water really is H2O),
and that is something we obviously cannot know by mere reection on our
concept of water. Let us call a fact c-knowable when it is such that one can
know it merely on the basis of being competent with the relevant concepts.1
Twin-Earth style thought experiments can, it appears, be constructed for
any natural kind concept. It follows that the essences of natural kinds are,
quite generally, not c-knowable.
I accept this consequence of externalism. However, we can still askwhet-
her mere possession of a concept might put one in a position to know the
reference-xers of a natural kind concept.2 Do Kripke-Putnam style argu-
ments also show that reference-xing conditions are not c-knowable? Or is
there a set of properties such that, merely on the basis of one’s competence
with a natural kind concept, one can know that those properties x its ref-
erence?
Quite a few philosophers have claimed that Kripke-Putnam style ar-
guments can be used to establish that reference-xers are not c-knowable
(for example, Block and Stalnaker 1999, Byrne and Pryor 2006, Nimtz 2004,
Schroeter 2004). In all these papers, the authors construct clever thought ex-
periments to show that various seemingly promising candidates for reference-
xing descriptions fail. For example, ChristianNimtz (2004) argues that, for
any property F that we might be tempted to include in the usual candidate
for a reference-xing description for ‘water’ (i.e. something like ‘the clear,
odorless and tasteless liquid which primarily lls the oceans’), we can imag-
ine situations such that, were it to turn out that the actual world is like that,
‘water’ would denote something which is not F.3 e authors all go on to
1 Some theorists are happy to call c-knowable propositions a priori; however, I do not want
to get dragged into discussions of whether any genuine knowledge is justied wholly in-
dependently of sensory experience. Readers sceptical of the a priori are free to interpret
c-knowledge as conceptual knowledge the justication for which is ultimately empirical.
2 From now on, I will limit my attention to natural kinds and natural kind concepts.
3 More recently, Nimtz has changed his mind and come to defend a view not dissimilar to
the one I am sketching (see Nimtz forthcoming).
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conclude that no c-knowable descriptions which do the job are to be had.
ese claims are typically made as criticisms of two-dimensional seman-
tics. e main two-dimensionalists, Chalmers (1996, and elswhere) and
Jackson (1998), do put a lot of weight on the view that we can c-know the
reference-xers (under the banner of “A-intensions” or “primary intensions”)
of the words on which Kripke and Putnam focused. While I do want to de-
fend such c-knowability, this should not automatically be taken as an en-
dorsement of two-dimensionalism, for at least two reasons. First, two-di-
mensionalism makes strong claims about the knowledge of primary inten-
sions being a priori, and I am not sure whether c-knowability amounts to
a priori knowability in any traditional sense of the term. Secondly, two-
dimensionalism maintains that primary intensions are a component of se-
mantic content, a further commitment which I am not sure I want to take
on board. In this paper I am interested in the question: does mere semantic
competence with a natural kind term put one in a position to know any-
thing substantial about natural kinds or about the contents of one’s natural
kind concepts? I will mostly set aside the further questions of whether such
knowledge, if it exists, deserves to be called a priori, or whether it concerns
something which deserves to be called semantic content.
2. ree ways of specifying reference-xers
In this section I will distinguish between three dierent kinds of specica-
tion for reference-xers and claim that the question ofwhether the reference-
xers of natural kind concepts are c-knowablemaydepend crucially onwhich
kind of specication we have in mind.
2.1 Conditional-conjunctive specications
e critics mentioned above all rely on Kripke-Putnam style thought exper-
iments to argue against c-knowability. Just as, for example, Kripke’s cele-
brated Gödel/Schmidt example showed that the description ‘the man who
proved the incompleteness of arithmetic’ cannot either give the meaning or
x the reference of the name ‘Gödel’, these critics claim that for any pro-
posed reference-xing description, we can imagine situations in which that
description gets the reference of the expression wrong. e implication is
that those who think reference-xers are c-knowable have not fully learned
their lesson from reading Kripke and Putnam.
I think this strategy is self-defeating. In evaluating proposed counter-
examples we are relying on intuitive evidence about what our words denote;
that is, we are relying on c-knowable reference-xers, at least of a certain
sort (see below). ought experiments can only provide counter-examples
to particular claims about what the reference-xing conditions are, not to
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their c-knowability in general.
Because of this reliance on semantic intuitions, the strategy of using
thought experiment presupposes that reference-xers are c-knowable, at least
under the following kind of specication:
(W1) e reference of ‘water’ is xed by the property of being composed
of H2O if the actual world is thus-and-so, and being composed of
XYZ if . . . , and being composed of H2O or XYZ if . . . , and . . .
where we would have a separate conjunct for each situation we can imag-
ine in our thought experiments. us, one conjunct will say that, were it
miraculously to turn out that the actual world is just like the world Putnam
described Twin Earth to be, the reference of ‘water’ would be xed to stu
which has themolecular constitutionXYZ. Another conjunctwould say that,
were it to turn out that water is like jade, ‘water’ would denote stu which is
either H2O or XYZ. And similarly for any other imaginable situation.4
To say that reference-xers, as specied in (W1), are c-knowable is really
only to say that the theory of reference is properly done from the armchair.
is is, of course, how Kripke and Putnam did theory of reference: by con-
sidering various ways the actual world might turn out to be, and consult-
ing their intuitions about what their terms would denote in these situations
(and, what they would denote in counterfactual situations, given certain as-
sumptions about what the actual world is like). And the critics clearly accept
this methodology; they, too, are relying on semantic intuitions, elicited by
thought experiments. Hence, the strategy of the critics in fact presupposes
that reference-xers are c-knowable.
Of course, (W1) is not very informative—it is merely a list (an innite
one) of all the intuitive verdicts we would have in response to dierent epis-
temic possibilities. To get amore substantial specication of reference xers,
some kind of a generalisation of these intuitions would need to be available.
e other two kinds of specication are attempts at such generalisations.
2.2 Reference-theoretic specications
If the theory of reference is properly done from the armchair, and a complete
theory of natural kind terms is possible, a more substantial specication of
reference-xers will be c-knowable.
is point is familiar from the writings of David Lewis and Frank Jack-
son; for example:
4 In fact, (W1) would contain countless separate conjuncts for scenarios in which ‘water’
denotes H2O (or XYZ, or their disjunction etc. . . ).ese would vary in ways which make
no dierence at all to the denotation of ‘water’—we would have a separate conjunct for
each and every epistemically possible scenario.
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e descriptive sense associated with a name might for instance be
‘the place I have heard of under the name ‘Taromeo” or maybe ‘the
causal source of this token: Taromeo’, and for an account of the rela-
tion being invoked here, just consult the writings of causal theorists
of reference. (Lewis 1997, 399)
Similarly, then, if a complete causal theory of reference for natural kind
terms is to be had, and if such a theory is motivated solely by thought exper-
iment, we should expect something like the following to be c-knowable:
(W2) e reference of ‘water’ is xed by the property of being the stu
at the beginning of causal chains of the appropriate type ending
with my use of ‘water’.
To guard against misunderstanding: I am merely claiming that, if a causal
theory is possible, (W2) will be c-knowable (of course, ‘causal chains of the
appropriate type’ will need to be spelled out). I do not want to follow the
causal descriptivists in claiming that such descriptions give the meanings of
natural kind terms, for at least two reasons. Firstly, the descriptions would
appear to always contain indexicals, and secondly, there is no reason to think
that the descriptions would always be shared across speakers and times. But
again, the c-knowability of something like (W2) is in fact presupposed by
those who take armchair methods to be sucient for doing the theory of
reference.
2.3 Descriptive specications
e third,most substantive specication of reference-xing conditionswould
claim that we can give the specication using onlymanifest properties.us,
we might think that something like (W3) holds:
(W3) e reference of ‘water’ is xed by the property of being the clear,
odorless, drinkable stuwhich primarily lls the oceans and lakes.
It is precisely against specications like (W3) that Schroeter andNimtzmount
their attacks. Even if they succeed in this, we’ve already seen that it would
be a mistake to conclude that they’ve shown that reference-xers are not c-
knowable at all.
Schroeter andNimtz do, I think, succeed in showing that simple descrip-
tions such as (W3) will not do: for any property we think should gure in
the description, we can imagine ways the world might turn out to be, such
that ‘water’ would refer to stu which lacks that property. And simple xes
such as requiring the majority of properties listed to be instantiated will, it
seems obvious, fail for similar reasons.
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I will suggest a direction for solving such problems at the end of this
paper. For the time being, I will just note that we should have some reason
for optimism on this matter. Our semantic judgments do not come out of
nowhere; and most of the time we have no serious diculty in saying what
‘water’ or other natural kind terms would denote, given dierent ways the
worldmight turn out to be. We should not let the fact that, in thought exper-
iments, we usually consider dicult cases blind us to the fact that for most
scenarios we might consider, the answers would be quite obvious. It would
be surprising if no description of the features which guide our semantic in-
tuitions could be given, as a matter of principle. We should not be too hasty
in concluding, on the basis of the failure of the rather obvious candidates,
that no descriptive specication is possible.
3. Sortal constraints
We have seen that there are (at least) three ways of specifying reference-
xers. e c-knowability of the rst, conditional-conjunctive kind should
be admitted by anyone who accepts the intuition-driven methodology gen-
erally used by externalists. Now I want to look at a problem that arises for
the second and third kind of specication (and, plausibly, for any kind of
specication which attempts to formulate a useful generalisation).
Schroeter (2004) has pointed out that specications of these types5 will
need to include a sortal: we need to be told what ‘stu ’ means in (W2) and
(W3).e reason is that, without a sortal, reference failurewill be dicult to
account for. According to Schroeter, the sortal constraint is an insurmount-
able obstacle for conceptual analysis: we cannot c-know what the proper
sortals are for our natural kind terms.
Here is her central example:
Consider the four classical elements: earth, air, re and water. Aris-
totle took these to be four basic congurations of primematter which
entered into the constitution of all material bodies. [. . . ] So a modern
analyst might be tempted to say Aristotle’s ‘water’ concept referred to
that basic conguration of prime matter which most closely satised
Aristotle’s own criteria for identifying water in the actual world. If
that is what Aristotle had in mind, however, his ‘water’ concept did
not manage to refer to anything at all—or at least not anything in this
world.” (Schroeter 2004, 437)
is is not, of course what we want to say. We want to be able to say that
Aristotle’s ‘water’ concept did refer to water—he just had mistaken views
about the underlying nature of water.
5 To be precise, Schroeter only considers descriptive specications, but obviously a sortal
will be needed for reference-theoretic specications as well, for identical reasons.
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What, then, is the appropriate sortal for ‘water’? ‘Basic conguration
of prime matter’ is clearly too strict. Schroeter considers other candidates
(Schroeter 2004, 438). We might think that something like ‘the structural
kind that underlies watery phenomena6 in the actual world’ would do the
job. And this would seem to give the right account of ‘water’. e trou-
ble with this suggestion is that it will not generalize: Aristotle thought that
‘earth’, ‘re’, ‘air’, and ‘water’ were on a par, so we should expect the same
sortals to have been associated with each one. Earth turned out not to be a
structural kind; hence, Aristotle’s ‘earth’ would come out non-referring. And
that cannot be right.
We might try a yet more liberal sortal: ‘the substance that underlies wa-
tery phenomena in the actual world’. Now ‘earth’ behaves as it should, but the
sortal is still too strict, for Aristotle’s ‘re’ comes out non-referring: re has
turned out not to be a substance, but a process. Schroeter concludes that no
appropriate sortal can be specied. Yet we clearly do need a sortal, because
otherwise we run the risk of making reference-failure impossible. Without a
sortal, we might be forced to say that ‘phlogiston’ does refer, aer all, not to
a substance but something like oxygen decit.
e solution is to recognize that there need not be a single sortal associ-
ated with a natural kind term. Rather, I think that natural kind terms have
a conditional sortal structure. For ‘water’, the structure would be roughly as
follows:
(W4) e reference of ‘water’ is xed to:
the unique structural kind that underlies watery phenomena
in the actual world, if there is one;
failing that, the nite disjunction of structural kinds which
underlie watery phenomena in the actual world, if such ex-
ists;
failing that, the functional kind that underlies watery phe-
nomena in the actual world, if there is one;
failing that, the process that underlies watery phenomena in
the actual world, if there is one;
failing that, . . .
. . .
. . . failing that, nothing.
Something similar would presumably hold for other natural kind terms, too,
6 e use of ‘watery phenomena’ here suggests, of course, a descriptive specication. But
obviously the problem arises equally for reference-theoretic specications. I will ignore
this complication below; similar reasoning will apply for both kinds of specication.
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but there is no reason to think that the sortal structure would be identical
for all natural kind concepts.
One might think that a conditional specication of this kind is far too
sophisticated to be assumed to be c-knowable just on the basis of one’s se-
mantic competence. But my claim is not that such a structure would have to
be learned in order to become competent, or that it should be even remotely
obvious to competent speakers. Rather, to become competent one has to
acquire a set of dispositions towards a pattern of (possible) usage which
conforms to such a structure. Our semantic intuitions make this pattern
of usage manifest, and the conditional sortal structure is a systematization
of such a pattern. Natural kind terms prefer a unique structural kind, but
this preference is defeasible. We nd out what the structure is like by con-
sulting our semantic intuitions about the reference of ‘water’, given various
ways the world might turn out to be.
4. Objections and Replies
4.1 “A Posteriori Externalism”
e view that our natural kind concepts prefer unique structural kinds as
their referents, but may still denote something if unique structural kinds are
not to be had, has been suggested as a way of possibly rescuing semantic ex-
ternalism from the problems of reference failure (Gallois 1996) and the prob-
lems of self-knowledge (McLaughlin and Tye 1998, Korman 2006, Haukioja
2006). Sören Häggqvist and Åsa Wikforss (Häggqvist and Wikforss 2007,
Wikforss 2005) have presented a number of objections to this line of thought.
I will here quickly respond to what I take to be their central concerns.
Wikforss’smain complaint is that conditional sortal structures are ad hoc
and violate the spirit of externalism:
Putnam and Kripke both reach their anti-descriptivist conclusions by
arguing that intuition tells us that none of the descriptions associated
with ‘water’ or ‘gold’ are necessary. On the disjunctivist [conditional]
view, however, intuition can tell us nothing about the modal status of
statements about water, since intuition can tell us nothing about the
semantics of ‘water’. (Wikforss 2005, 78)
I think this misrepresents both the conditional view and the views of Kripke
and Putnam. Putnam, in particular, clearly argued that, if the actual world
is roughly as we think it is (water-wise), then ‘water’ is a rigid designator, and
any descriptions we may associate with ‘water’ will be at best contingently
true of water. Similarly, on a conditional view such as the one I sketched
above, it is simply not true that “intuition can tell us nothing about the se-
mantics of ‘water”’. On the contrary, intuition (and only intuition) tells us
Jussi Haukioja 89
how the semantics of ‘water’ varies as a function of how the actual world
turns out.7
Similar remarks apply toWikforss and Häggqvist’s worry that what they
call “a posteriori semantics” would sever the connection between speakers’
intentions and the semantics of their terms in an unacceptable way. eir
main target of criticism is a view on which “the details of the environment
determine what sort of a term a given expression is, and hence what kind of
semantics they should be given in the rst place” (Häggqvist and Wikforss
2007, 380). But of course the sensible externalist will not claim that the envi-
ronment, all by itself, determines such things. Our intentions determine the
semantics of ‘water’, for any given way the world might turn out to be—our
physical environment merely determines which of these ways is the actual
one.
Häggqvist andWikforss do acknowledge views of this kind (which posit
subjectswithwhat they call “disjunctive intentions”—“conditional intentions”
would, in my view, be more accurate), only to dismiss them quite quickly:
. . . the appeal to disjunctive intentions clearly requires ordinary speak-
ers to have intentions concerning semantics, involving semantic the-
ories, and attributing suchmeta-semantic intentions [. . . ] to ordinary
speakers is utterly implausible. (Häggqvist and Wikforss 2007, 382)
But surely the intentions need not (and do not) concern semantic theories!
It is enough that speakers have the kinds of intuitions about the application
of ‘water’ which are captured in something like (W4)—and at least in my
own case, fairly simple thought experimentation is enough to bring these
out. Semantic theories may be formulated to systematize such intuitions,
but it would be absurd to require speakers to have explicit intentions about
reference determination.
4.2 Social Externalism
So far I have been almost exclusively concerned with physical externalism.
Onemight worry that social externalism would cause problems for my view.
If a certain kind of social externalism is true, it could apparently always turn
7 Accordingly, Wikforss’s claim that “no thought-experiment, such as the Twin Earth-
experiment, can be used to support the a posteriori externalist [i.e. conditional structure]
position” (Wikforss 2005, 79) is simply false. e conditional structure gets all its sup-
port from our intuitions about what we would say in response to various Twin Earth-like
thought experiments; the only dierence is that, unlike in the most common Twin Earth
experiments, we are now contemplating various ways the actual world might turn out to
be. But this dierence does not in the least violate the spirit of externalist thought exper-
imentation: Putnam was already engaged in this kind of reasoning in “e meaning of
‘meaning”’ (Putnam 1975, 241).
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out that I am not fully competent with a given concept, and hence any claims
about reference-xers that Imight arrive at bymere reection onmy concept
would be empirically defeasible. Although I have avoided explicitly equating
c-knowability with apriority, it would still be natural to worry that such em-
pirical defeasibility would call into question the claim that reference-xers
are c-knowable.
Social externalism, if accepted, will have an eect on the specication
of reference-xers which we should think of as c-knowable, but I do not
think that it causes any serious problems. To clarify matters it will be helpful
here to rely on the distinction between instrumental and pure deference (see
Jylkkä 2009, 37–38). In short, a speaker or thinker defers to experts instru-
mentally when he or she relies on the experts to be more reliable about the
empirically discoverable essences of natural kinds.is notion of deference
is, I think, what people usually have in mind when they think the folk defer
to experts with respect to their natural kind concepts. It is important to note
that instrumental deference does not cause any complications for my view:
the experts will merely be more knowledgeable about which clause of the c-
knowable conditional structure will “kick in”—instrumental deference has
no eect on the structure itself.
e pure deferrer, on the other hand, defers to experts on the condi-
tional structure itself: on the way the semantics of a kind term varies as a
function of how the world turns out to be. A pure deferrer’s intentions with
respect to his or her natural kind concept leaves open the possibility that,
whatever kind of stu he or she might believe ‘water’ could turn out refer to,
these intentions could be overridden if they turned out to be at odds with
the experts’metasemantic intentions. If we in fact are pure deferrers with re-
spect to our natural kind concepts—and this assumption is more controver-
sial than the assumption of wide-spread instrumental deference—then we
will need to embed the conditional sortal structure in another conditional,
along the following lines:
(W5) If my metasemantic intentions are aligned with the experts, then
the reference of ‘water’ is xed to:
the unique structural kind that underlies watery phenomena
in the actual world, if there is one;
failing that, the nite disjunction of structural kinds which
underlie watery phenomena in the actual world, if such ex-
ists;
failing that, the functional kind that underlies watery phe-
nomena in the actual world, if there is one;
failing that, the process that underlies watery phenomena in
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the actual world, if there is one;
failing that, . . .
. . .
. . . failing that, nothing.
Hence, if pure deference exists, the c-knowable specications of reference-
xers turn out to be even more complex, but that does not make them any
less c-knowable.
4.3 Isis Conceptual Analysis?
Yet another kind of worry about the view I am proposing is that the claims
about reference-xerswill truly be results of conceptual analysisonly onpain
of collapsing my position to two-dimensionalism, or another related form
of two-factor semantics. Even if reference-xers are c-knowable, the worry
goes, as long as I deny that the reference-xers give themeanings of natural
kind terms, the activity bywhichwe arrive at them is not conceptual analysis,
but something dierent.
I do not want to place too much of an emphasis on terminology—it
may be true that the armchair activity I am defending does not fully t
the traditional notion of conceptual analysis; the way we arrive at knowl-
edge of reference-xers is not by an analysis of the semantics of our natural
kind terms, but rather by reection on the metasemantic intentions which
make our natural kind terms express the concepts which they in fact express.
However, the activity still looks very much like conceptual analysis: pro-
posed reference-xing descriptions are tested against our semantic judge-
ments concerning a range of ctional examples. And, most importantly for
my purposes, if the activity is successful, we arrive at c-knowledge of ref-
erence xers, and the counterarguments of Schroeter and Nimtz have been
answered.e question of whether or not the activity deserves to be called
“conceptual analysis” is of less importance.
5. Conclusions
I have claimed that some specications of reference-xersmust be c-knowable
if intuition-driven thought experimentation is the proper tool for doing the
theory of reference for natural kind terms. At the minimum, conditional-
conjunctive specications are. If a causal theory of reference for natural
kind terms is true, and conditional sortal structures are allowed, reference-
theoretic specications will be c-knowable as well.
e main moral of this discussion is that it is at best misleading to claim
that thought experiment can show that reference-xers are not c-knowable.
emost onemight be able to showbyTwin Earth-style thought experiment
92 Intuitions and Externalism
is that descriptive specications are not c-knowable.is is what the critics in
fact attempt to do.e important thing to notice is that even if they succeed,
(meta)conceptual analysis has not been shown to be impossible, it hasmerely
been shown to have certain limits.
Finally, a speculative suggestion. If a conditional structure is allowed
for the sortal, why not allow one for the manifest properties which gure in
the descriptive specications as well? I cannot develop this idea here, but
there does not seem to be any principled reason against such a view. If a
descriptive specication of the reference-xing conditions with conditional
structures both in the specication of the sortal and in the specication of
the manifest properties is possible, we have secured a place for a substantial
kind of conceptual analysis, without compromising any of the fundamental
insights of externalism.
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